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On Derivative Moral Responsibility and the Epistemic Connection
Required for Moral Responsibility
William SIMKULET
Abstract
Derivative moral responsibility is not moral responsibility at all. Much of the confusion
found in the literature concerning moral responsibility and the free will problem can be traced
back to a penchant to reconcile our philosophical theories of moral responsibility with our
folk commonsense linguistic accounts of moral responsibility, a tradition that is notable for
its utter lack of making two important distinctions - (1) the distinction between derivative
moral responsibility and non-derivative moral responsibility (what Galen Strawson calls
“true moral responsibility”) and (2) the distinction between the scope and degree of one’s
moral responsibility.1 The failure to make such distinctions, ultimately, leads to confusion
in interpreting the content of folk intuitions about moral responsibility, and as a result leads
many philosophers to adopt watered down, or overly complex theories of moral responsibility.
In “The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility,” Carl Ginet fails to make such
distinctions, and as a result the requirement he arrives at is unwieldy at best. By making such
distinctions, I will provide a much more straightforward account of what moral responsibility
requires.
Key Words: Moral Responsibility, Free Will, Derivative Moral Responsibility,
Commonsense Ethics

I
There is near unanimous consensus that for an agent to be morally responsible
for what she does, she must have a robust form of control over her actions; she
must be the author, or cause, of what she is morally responsible for. In contrast,
depending on one’s view, one can be derivatively morally responsible for things
that are partially or completely outside of one’s control. This is because derivative
moral responsibility is not a king of moral responsibility - rather it is a byproduct
of moral responsibility.
1

For an excellent account of the distinction between scope and degree, see Michael Zimmerman
2002. Zimmerman’s views on moral luck differ greatly from mine, but the distinction he draws
between the scope of one’s moral responsibility and the degree of one’s moral responsibility
is noteworthy.
Simkulet, William (2015) “On Derivative Moral Responsibility and the Epistemic Connection
Required for Moral Responsibility”, Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi, (2) pp. 61-75.
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According to Aristotle, agents can only be morally responsible for voluntary
actions, where an action was voluntary if and only if it satisfied awareness and
control conditions. An agent is morally responsible for something id and only
if she is in control of her actions and aware of what she does in some relevant
sense. In contrast, an agent is derivatively morally responsible for something if
and only if she is morally responsible for another thing and there is a relevant
causal connection between this other thing and what she is derivatively morally
responsible for. Consider the following case:
Reckless Firing
Susan is a well trained, competent police officer. On New Year’s Eve, he fires his
pistol into the air to celebrate the new year, fully aware that this action is dangerous
and might harm people. As it so happens, one of his shots hits his neighbor, Carol,
who was watching fireworks on her balcony.

Here it makes sense to say that Susan is morally responsible for freely
choosing to fire her pistol as she is both in control of this action and aware of what
she does (and possible results of her choice), but in an important sense she is not
aware that she is shooting her neighbor, nor is she in complete control over whether
her neighbor gets shot. However, Susan is derivatively morally responsible for
shooting her neighbor because her shooting her neighbor is causally connected in
a relevant way to something she is truly morally responsible for - her free choice
to fire her weapon.
To be morally responsible for something is to have one’s moral record
affected by that something; in other words to be morally responsible for something
is to be the appropriate object of moral praise or blame as a result.2 If an agent is
derivatively morally responsible for something, her moral record is not further
affected - that is to say that she is no more or less blameworthy or praiseworthy as
a result.3 Michael Zimmerman notably contends that one’s moral record includes
both a scope of moral responsibility, and a degree of moral responsibility, where
the degree is determined by the scope, which includes both moral responsibility
An agent may be praiseworthy to a 0-degree if the agent performs a morally indifferent act;
see Derek Pereboom 2005 for such a case.
3
Zimmerman, in his 2002 article, contends that one’s moral record is affected by what one is
derivatively morally responsible for. On his view, the scope of one’s moral responsibility
may grow or shrink based off of what one is derivatively morally responsible for, but one’s
degree of moral responsibility remains constant.
2
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and derivative moral responsibility. 4 However, it seems to me that introducing the
concept of the scope of one’s moral responsibility is nothing more than an attempt
to reconcile one’s theory with our imprecise folk moral language conventions
and adds nothing of value to the discussion of moral responsibility simpliciter.
Consider the following cases:
Archery Contest
Jan intends to win the local archery contest, aims her arrow, fires it, and hits the
bull’s-eye. Jane also intends to win the contest, aims her arrow, fires it, but misses
the bull’s-eye because her arrow is intercepted by an unusually thick bird that Jane
couldn’t have known would swoop by at just that instant. Jen, too, intends to win
the local archery contest, aims her arrow, but although she wills herself to fire the
arrow, she has a muscle spasm that prevents her from doing so, causing her to
misfire. Let’s say such muscle spasms routinely, but sporadically, occur in archers
who engage in the sort of strenuous exercise that all of the archers in the contest
engage in. Finally, Jenny intends to win the local archery contest, aims her arrow,
fires it, but misses the bull’s-eye because, unbeknownst to her, her eyesight has
recently been impaired in such a way that she had no reason to suspect. Jan wins
the archery contest.

Jan, Jane, Jen, and Jenny each exert the same control over their actions, and
each is has the same awareness of what they do; as such it strikes me that it makes
sense to say that each of them is equally morally responsible for what they’ve
done. However, to an impartial third party observer not privy to the details, Jan the only contestant to hit the bull’s-eye is apparently more praiseworthy than the
rest. Jan is derivatively morally responsible for winning the contest because her
winning of the contest is causally connected to something she was in sufficient
control of.
What is Jan truly morally responsible for? Jane’s case demonstrates that
whether or not one’s perfectly aimed arrow hits the bull’s-eye is a matter of
luck insofar as it depends upon factors completely outside of the control of the
archer. Many philosophers claim that the regress ends here - that Jan is morally
responsible for firing her arrow. This is a mistake - Jen’s case demonstrates that
Jan is also derivatively morally responsible for her acting firing the arrow because
whether or not her body responds to her will is not up to her (insofar as sporadic
muscle spasms undermine the normal causal effect one’s will has on one’s body).
4

See Zimmerman 2002.
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If this is right, Jan is morally responsible for her will, which can be described as
her acting with certain intentions and desires - her intention to win the tournament,
her desire to participate, etc. This is something that each of the contestants has in
common and thus each can be said to be equally morally responsible. I contend
that moral agents (like us) are only morally responsible for acts of the will - it is
the only thing we’re said to have complete control over - we are the sole author of
our own wills - and thus the only thing that one can be held morally responsible
for.5
Jenny’s case is perhaps the most strange, as the deficiency that led to her
missing is located before her will, not after. This is to say that the reason she failed
to hit the bull’s-eye is a byproduct not of resultant luck, but on circumstantial
luck. Through no fault of her own, she contingently lacks an ability the other
archers have - good eyesight, and she is utterly ignorant of this fact. If she was not
ignorant, she could have acted differently which may have resulted in her hitting
the bull’s-eye. She exerts the same control over what she does as others, and she
has the same awareness of what she tries to do as others; and this is what matters.
There are, I think, two possible objections to this account - Some might
contend that (A) one’s moral responsibility, in particular the blame or praise
one deserves, is determined by the consequences of one’s actions; and (B) this
account contradicts our commonsense moral language - after all, we say things
like “Jones is morally responsible for killing Smith”, and “What makes Jones
blameworthy for killing Smith is that he did something terrible - he killed Smith.”
The contention that this account is inconsistent with everyday moral language
shouldn’t be taken as evidence that the view is wrong because such commonsense
moral language utterly fails to capture all relevant respects of moral responsibility –
5

Those scholars familiar with the problem of moral luck should take me to task for contending
that control is undermined by resultant luck – luck in the consequences of one’s willings,
or actions, but for not asserting the same about situational luck. The problem of situational
luck is, I think, a mistake – at least in this context. This is because, intuitively, no one is
every justly held morally responsible for the circumstances they find themselves in, and no
one has any immediate control over the character they act with at any given time, nor do we
often have control over the causal processes by which we choose (those who flip coins to
make difficult decisions being obvious exceptions). The only sense in which situational luck
matters is that it gives an agent a different quantity or quality of opportunities to act morally
in. Luck in this sense matters only if one is concerned with the quantity of marks on one’s
moral record. In this paper, and in everyday commonsense moral language, we are not, so
situational luck doesn’t undermine the control required for moral responsibility.
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as noted earlier, it fails to distinguish between moral responsibility simpliciter and
derivative moral responsibility, to distinguish degree from scope, and furthermore
to distinguish between differences in degree of moral blame or praise. Consider
the following two cases:
Jones 1
Jones1, a recovering alcoholic, keeps a bottle of wine in his study that he has
poisoned, a reminder that alcohol is poison. He tries to put alcohol out of his mind
at every step, and rarely thinks about the wine anymore. Jones1’s cousin, Smith1,
comes to visit, and his flight arrives early. He informs Jones1 of this, who tells
Smith1 where his hidden key is, and tells Smith1 “my home is your home”, which
Smith1 understands to mean that he can help himself to the food and drink in the
house, which is pretty much what Jones1 means when he says this. Jones1 fails
to mention the bottle of wine because he didn’t think of it. Smith1 finds the wine
and drinks some.
Jones 2
Jones2 knows his cousin Smith2 is an alcoholic. He picks up a bottle of wine,
poisons it, and hides it in his study, believing that if Smith2 finds the bottle and
drinks from it, that he “deserves what he gets”. Smith2 arrives early and calls
Jones2 who tells him where to find the key, and that “my home is your home.”
Smith2 finds the wine and drinks some.

Although both Jones1 and Jones2 can be said to have killed their cousin,
it seems uncontroversially true that they’re differently morally responsible for
what they’ve done. Specifically, Jones1 is prima facie not morally blameworthy
for what he’s done (insofar as he didn’t intend harm, nor did he believe any harm
would arise from the action he took for symbolic reasons), and that Jones2 is
prima facie morally blameworthy for what he’s done (insofar as he intended harm
to befall Smith2, or at the very least acted in a way in which he believed had an
unreasonable risk of causing harm to Smith2). For those who contend that moral
responsibility is, in part, decided by the actual outcome, it seems that Jones1 and
Jones2 would need to be equally morally blameworthy at least in this regard – but
Jones1 doesn’t seem morally blameworthy in any substantial sense. There is, of
course, good reason for one to judge Jones1 and Jones2 to be similarly morally
blameworthy on the basis of the consequences alone if we don’t have any other
information, but surely if we came to know the whole story any initial criticism of
Jones1 would be revise because although Jones1’s action of poisoning the wine
caused a natural evil – Smith1’s death, the will behind Jones1’s action lacked a
65
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morally relevant epistemic connection to Smith1’s death, or any similar harm. By
epistemic connection, I mean a contingent similarity or relationship between the
relevant epistemological content of one’s will and the consequences one believes
one’s will might result in.
Consider the epistemic content of Jones2’s will; he knows what poison is,
he knows what he is doing, he knows Smith2 will likely drink from the bottle,
he knows that if Smith2 does, he will be poisoned, etc. As it so happens, this
epistemic content - specifically that concerning how Jones2 thinks events will
play out - bears a striking and robust similarity to the actual outcome. Indeed, this
similarity is no coincidence - Jones2 chooses his actions with this result in mind.
However, I contend that what makes Jones2’s action morally wrong isn’t
just the fact that, in the actual world, Smith2 is poisoned, rather what matters is
the epistemic connection between Jones2’s will and every world he believed his
action could bring about. What makes Jones2’s will morally blameworthy is that
he acted in such a way that he believed would likely cause evil believing he could
have acted otherwise.6
It seems to me that there are two ways in which one’s epistemological
content can affect one’s degree of blame or praise for one’s willings - the expected
probability of one’s will to affect the world in such and such a way, and the desire
that one’s will affects the world in such and such a way. Compare a hunter who
believes that there is a 1% chance the thing she is aiming at is a person (and not a
deer) and shoots (hoping for a deer), to a hunter who believes that there is a 50%
chance the thing she is aiming at it a person and shoots (still hoping for a deer).
Clearly the greater risk of harm makes the latter hunter’s will blameworthy to a
higher degree than the former hunter’s.7 This is because out of all of the worlds
in question – the worlds the agent thinks possible, the worlds the agent hopes
possible (but doesn’t necessarily think possible), and the worlds the agent fears
possible (but again, doesn’t necessarily think possible), there are more worlds
were the second hunter causes more harm than the first, and thus the second
Those who believe that Frankfurt’s infamous 1969 argument against the requirement of
alternate possibilities succeeded may ignore this condition. I believe that the Kane/Widerker
objection is sufficient to show Frankfurt’s argument fails, and thus this condition is necessary,
but any further discussion on the matter is outside of the scope of this paper. See Kane 1985,
1996; Widerker 1995.
7
Presumably there is some level of risk that is morally acceptable, given the expected award,
but the weighing of such considerations is outside the scope of this paper.
6
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hunter is blameworthy to a higher degree (because the epistemic content of the
hunter’s will is mirrors the comparably large amount of evil found in these worlds
she expected, hoped, or feared possible). Now consider a third hunter who also
believes that there is a 1% chance that thing she is aiming at is person, and shoots
that thing hoping it’s an innocent person. What makes the third hunter more
blameworthy than the first is that in all worlds she hopes possible, her will causes
her to kill someone. In contrast, in all of the worlds the first hunter fears possible,
her will causes her to kill someone. I contend that wanting, or hoping, to cause an
evil is prima facie more morally blameworthy than being afraid of causing said
evil, and because of this, the epistemic connection between the third hunter’s will
and the evil in the worlds she thought, hoped, or feared possible is higher than
between the first hunter’s will and the evil thought, hoped, or feared possible.
Although both hunters share the same set of worlds in question, the order of their
preference in regards to these worlds is different, and there is a greater epistemic
connection to worlds one expects possible than one hopes and fears possible, and
a greater epistemic connection to worlds one hopes possible than fears possible. 8
Finally, consider a hunter who doesn’t care what she hits. It seems to me
prima facie plausible to say that the epistemic connection between this agent’s
will and the harm she thinks, hopes, or fears possible is lower than the third hunter,
but higher than the first. However, I think this is a mistake for three reasons. First,
it seems to me prima facie morally true that doing the right thing for the wrong
reason is morally wrong, so the agent who acts without a reason forfeits any
potential counterbalancing praise she might get from the probability of her doing
the right thing (because everything she does will be, by definition, wrong). Second,
it seems perfectly plausible to say that the third hunter intends to bring about one
particular kind of bad outcome (harm a person), but not necessarily others (harm
an endangered species, harm the environment, etc.), while this last hunter risks
all such harms equally. She may be more blameworthy than the second in the
same way the rapist who rapes a million people is more blameworthy than the
murderer who kills only one. Thirdly, by not caring about the potential outcomes,
the agent shouldn’t be judged on the ill of her expected possible outcomes because
she doesn’t restrict (or even consider) worlds in this way. Because she fails to
8

It seems to me perfectly intuitively plausible to say that the third hunter, who hopes to kill
a human despite believing that it is severely unlikely, is as morally blameworthy as a fourth
hunter who hopes to kill a human while believing that there is a good chance that what she’s
shooting at is a human, but I will not argue for such a position here.
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distinguish between the worlds she cares about and the worlds she doesn’t (those
she believes impossible, etc.), she can be held blameworthy for the epistemic
connection (of indifference) to all of these worlds. As such, the cumulative
evils and no counterbalancing good aspects of this last hunter seem to make her
substantially more morally blameworthy than we might initially suspect.9
On this view, what makes an agent morally blameworthy is the epistemic
connection her will has to the harm at the worlds she expects, hopes, and fears
possible, where the actual world is (at best) one of many worlds, and isn’t any
more or less morally relevant than any other in the set. Unlike those who hold
that one’s praise or blame is determined by the consequences of one’s actions, this
view removes luck from the picture, and explains why Jan, Jane, Jen, and Jenny
are all equally morally responsible despite having vastly different outcomes. It is,
however, true that the bad or good consequences that end up occurring do play
a part in determining the rightness or wrongness of the agent’s action. To the
extent that an agent’s will has a high success rate, any given good or bad outcome
is evidence that the agent willed that outcome, and this evidence is often what
prompts our moral investigations and judgments. Furthermore, by appealing to
the epistemic connection between one’s will and the worlds the agent expects,
fears, and hopes possible, it is easy to articulate what makes two agents who
cause the same outcome differently morally responsible – the degree of their
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness depends upon their epistemic connections.
I call this view, that moral agents are morally responsible for their wills, moral
intentionalism.
II
In light of this account of what agents are morally responsible for (their will),
what they’re derivatively morally responsible for (that which their will causes,
directly or indirectly), and what makes the agent more or less blameworthy or
praiseworthy (the connection between the epistemic content of one’s will and the
expected, hoped, or feared possible worlds), we’re in a goods position to better
9

If you believe that it is impossible for an agent to be indifferent in this way, ignore all
discussion of this last hunter. It seems to me that compatibilists and several event-causal
incompatibilists contend that moral agents can only act for reasons, and this hunter seems
to act only for no reason. However, at least agent-causal indeterminists seem to leave this
possibility open.
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judge problematic examples. Consider the following two cases from Carl Ginet’s
“The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility”:
Simon enters the hotel room he has just checked into and flips what appears to
be, and what he takes to be, an ordinary light switch, but, to his surprise and
consternation, the flipping of the switch sets off a loud fire alarm. It seems that,
because he did not know that his flipping the switch would have this unfortunate
consequence, it would be wrong to feel indignant with him for bringing about that
consequence (Ginet, 269).
Consider a revised version of our example of Simon and the switch that set off a fire
alarm. Suppose that the switch did not look at all like an ordinary light switch—the
whole thing was red, much larger than a typical light switch, and located fairly
high up on the wall. Moreover, immediately below it in large white letters on a
red background were the words “FIRE ALARM”. Simon is a normal adult whose
native language is English and he has been about in the world enough to know
about the typical appearance of light switches and about fire alarms. But so intent
was he on finding a light switch that he somehow failed to notice the words “FIRE
ALARM”, or to take in the significance of the conspicuous differences between the
switch he pulled and a typical light switch, and thought that the switch he flipped
would just turn on a light. As Simon himself later confessed in making profuse
apologies, his failure to notice or heed those things was inexcusable. A certain
amount of indignation towards him, for his causing the alarm to go off, would be
deserved (though, of course, not as much as if he had intentionally set it off ) (271).

In the first version of the Simon case, Ginet’s assessment seems intuitively
plausible – for the moral intentionalist, Simon is morally responsible for willing
to flip the switch (in that situation), and is derivatively morally responsible for
flipping the switch, for setting off the fire alarm, etc. What makes it inappropriate to
“feel indignant” about his action is that Simon lacked any reasonable expectation
to believe the switch would set off the fire alarm – this is to say that in all of the
worlds he expected, hoped, or feared, there are relatively few (if any) worlds
where his pulling the switch causes harm, let alone harm of this kind (disturbing
the hotel occupants and firefighters).
The intuitive plausibility of Ginet’s account of the first version stands in
sharp contrast to his account of the second version. Oddly, Ginet seems to want
to hold Simon v2 responsible for not paying appropriate attention to the switch,
which was labeled “FIRE ALARM”, when he was intent on flipping a light
switch. Perhaps Simon v2 was in a relatively well-lit room but wanted a bit more
light; set this aside. Ginet claims that Simon v2 is morally responsible for flipping
69
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the switch under these conditions, but he also stipulates that at the time he flips
the switch, he is unaware of these situations. Simon v2 appears to have no more
reasonable expectation that he would set off the fire alarm in this case than in the
first case. What Ginet claims makes Simon responsible for turning on the fire alarm
in this case, but not the previous one, is that his ignorance is morally culpable
ignorance. That is to say, apparently, Ginet believes that Simon should have read
the words “fire alarm” before flipping the switch. But despite Simon’s confession
of irresponsibility, it is easy to construct a back story where his ignorance is not
culpable: (a) If the room was dark then Simon v2 wouldn’t have been able to
read the label on the switch, (b) he might have been distracted by a phone call or
stubbed toe, or (c) he might have never considered the possibility that this hotel
that he is unfamiliar with would have placed a fire alarm where a light switch
would traditionally have been placed.
Still, it seems prima facie plausible that one could articulate conditions under
which Simon should have known the switch was a fire alarm:
Simon v3
Simon v3 speaks and reads fluent English and chooses to stay at a hotel because
of its famous architect who was infamously committed to an insane asylum for
his bizarre architectural decisions. During the day Simon v3 gets caught up in
exploring his hotel room, flipping various switches and opening various secret
compartments, and in his fervor he flips the switch labeled “FIRE ALARM”
without reading it.

Here it makes sense to say Simon v3 is morally responsible for his ignorance
(not reading the switch label before flipping it), and derivatively morally
responsible for setting off the fire alarm. Because Ginet doesn’t adequately
distinguish between moral responsibility, and derivative moral responsibility,
he tasks himself to provide a theory where Simon v2 is morally responsible for
tripping the fire alarm, rather than a theory of why he is morally responsible
for his ignorance or to what degree he’s responsible for said ignorance. For the
moral intentionalist, if Simon v2 acted carelessly (without the proper regard to
consequences), or if he acted fully aware of the risk of pulling the switch, there is
a robust epistemic connection between his will (to pull the switch w/o reading the
sign) and the evils that doesn’t exist in the first Simon case.
However, Ginet tasks himself to articulate a criterion for moral responsibility
that would show Simon v2 is morally responsible for not only his will to pull the
70
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switch (while having certain beliefs), but that he is also morally responsible for
his setting off the fire alarm. He calls this criterion the epistemic requirements for
moral responsibility:
S is blameworthy for bringing about (or failing to prevent) harm H by moving (or
omitting to move) in way M at t1 only if: [the CDO condition] at some time t0, not
later than t1, either (i) S acted in a certain way W such that it was open to S at t0
not to act in way W then and, had S not acted in way W then, it would have been
open to S at t1 not to make (or to make) M or any (some) other movement then that
would bring about (prevent) H, or (ii) S did not at t0 act in a certain way W such
that it was open to S at t0 to act in way W then and, had S acted in way W then, S
would have had it open to her at t1 not to make (or to make) M or any (some) other
movement then that would bring about (prevent) H; and [the epistemic condition]
either (i) S knew* at t0 that her acting (or omitting to act) in way W would or might
bring about (or, in the case of omission, prevent) a harmful act (or omission) of the
sort S subsequently committed at t1, or (ii) S did not at t0 know* this but there is a
sequence of one or more acts (or omissions) that ends with the act (or omission) at
t0and is such that (a) each member before this last member benights the subsequent
member, (b) the first (earliest) member of the sequence was not a benighted act (or
omission)-at the time of it S knew* that it would or might lead to the sort of harm it
in fact led to, namely, the benighted act (or omission) that is the next member of the
sequence, and (c) at the time of each benighted act (or omission) in the sequence S
should have known* (was blameworthy for not knowing*) that it would or might
lead to the sort of benighted act (or omission) that it in fact led to in the next
member of the sequence (276-277).

This requirement is full of technical terminology. To know* X, for Ginet, is to
actively believe X true (270). The term “benight” comes form Holly Smith’s 1983
article “Culpable Ignorance”; for Ginet one action benights another if and only if
the moral responsibility for the latter is determined by the culpable ignorance of
the former. Finally, the CDO condition is his version of the principle of alternate
possibilities, roughly requiring that the agent in question have the ability to bring
about a different outcome had they acted otherwise. In light of this, here is a more
condensed version of Ginet’s principle:
An agent S is blameworthy for bringing about harm H by doing motion M at t1
only if: [the CDO condition] at some time t0, no later than t1, S acted in a certain
way W such that it was open to S at t0 not to act in way W then and, had S not acted
in way W then, it would have been open to S at t1 not do M or another movement
then that would bring about H; and [the epistemic condition] either (i) S knew* at
t0 that her acting in way W would or might bring about a harmful act of the sort
S subsequently committed at t1, or (ii) S did not at t0 know* this but there is a
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sequence of one or more acts that ends with the act at t0 and is such that (a) each
member before this last member benights the subsequent member, (b) the first
(earliest) member of the sequence was not a benighted act (or omission)-at the time
of it S knew* that it would or might lead to the sort of harm it in fact led to, namely,
the benighted act that is the next member of the sequence, and (c) at the time of
each benighted act in the sequence S should have known* (was blameworthy for
not knowing*) that it would or might lead to the sort of benighted act that it in fact
led to in the next member of the sequence.

While this version is significantly more manageable, (ii) makes up over half
of the text. But (ii) doesn’t concern moral responsibility, but a kind of derivative
moral responsibility. Earlier I contended that an agent is derivatively morally
responsible for an action if and only if she is morally responsible for another
thing, and there is a causal connection of a relevant sort between that other thing
and what she is derivatively morally responsible for. The kind of connection Ginet
articulates in (ii) here is a blameworthy ignorance - he accounts for other kinds
of derivative moral responsibility earlier in this requirement. Consistent with
our folk moral linguistic practices, Ginet contends that agents can be morally
responsible simpliciter for the consequences of their actions (in this case, harm
H), and their bodily movements (in this case, M). However cases like those of
Jane, Jen, and Jenny show that whatever control one has over the harms one does,
and one’s bodily movements, is insufficient for moral responsibility. Furthermore,
such an account utterly fails to explain how an agent is morally responsible in
those cases where their actions go awry – again, Jane, Jen, and Jenny are all prima
facie praiseworthy for their actions despite their failures.
Ginet believes he’s captured the epistemic conditions for moral responsibility,
but it falls far short of this goal. It doesn’t talk about the epistemic conditions
for moral responsibility, rather it only talks about the epistemic conditions for
moral responsibility for a given actual harm H. It equivocates between moral
responsibility – which requires control, and derivative moral responsibility, which
requires no control over what happens past the initial action (for Ginet, M, for the
intentionalist – the agent’s intention, or willing to M). Even worse, Ginet’s CDO
condition concerns whether or not the agent can bring about alternate outcomes,
not whether or not the agent has alternate possibilities. Harry Frankfurt famously
argues that moral responsibility doesn’t require alternate outcomes, but fails to
show that moral responsibility doesn’t require alternate possibilities, where the
possibilities in question involve the epistemic content of the agent’s will, not the
actual outcomes of the agent’s will. Imagine a fifth archery competitor, June, who
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is as skilled as the other four, but rather than intend to win the match, she intends
to throw the match. Unbeknownst to her, her bow has also been sabotaged by the
mysterious Black such that if June attempted to hit the bull’s-eye, her arrow would
have swerved and hit the ground, but if she hadn’t it would have fired normally.
On Ginet’s view, June isn’t blameworthy because no matter what she willed, she
would have missed the target. Yet June’s will to throw the match has a direct,
non-arbitrary causal connection to her missing the bull’s-eye such that it makes
sense to say that she is blameworthy for it. Finally, Ginet’s account utterly fails
to explain what makes that thing the agent is morally responsible for more or less
morally good or bad - one might assume the weight of the harm determines the
degree of responsibility, but there are too many counterexamples to this view to
ascribe it to Ginet.
To better address cases like these, consider the following accounts:
What moral responsibility requires:
A moral agent S is morally responsible for some action A [where A is a
free willing] if and only if the agent has complete control over that action, where
having complete control of this kind requires (a) alternate possibilities, (b) that it
was within S’s power to do A for a reason.
What moral blame, praise, and neutrality require:
A moral agent S is morally blameworthy or praiseworthy for an action A
if and only if there is at least one epistemic connection between S’s reasons for
acting and the realm of possible or impossible worlds S believes, hopes, or fears
are within her grasp. (If S fails to narrow the realm of possible worlds, she treats
all worlds as if they are within her grasp). S is blameworthy to the extent to that the
(relevant) epistemic content behind A mirrors evils in these worlds either through
design or risk, and is praiseworthy to the extent to that the (relevant) epistemic
content behind A mirror the good in these worlds either through design or risk,
factoring in the least blameworthy and least praiseworthy alternatives10. An action
is neutral if and only if the act is morally indifferent (when all possible alternatives
are morally equivalent).

10

This conditional is based on Michael Otsuka’s principle of avoidable blame (and its
counterpart, a principle of avoidable praise). See Otsuka 1998, Simkulet 2015.
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What derivative moral responsibility requires:
A moral agent S is derivatively morally responsible for something X, where
X is an action, character trait, event, situation, object, etc., if and only if there is a
robust causal connection between some action A that S is morally responsible for,
and X, such that A caused X either directly (such as how one’s will to lift one’s
arm causes one’s body to lift one’s arm), or indirectly (such as how one’s will to
kill the pull the trigger to kill the president caused one’s body to pull the trigger
which caused the president to die, which caused the nation to grieve).
On this account, one can be derivatively morally responsible for something
that it would be improper to be blameworthy for (such as Simon’s being
derivatively morally responsible for pulling the fire alarm in the first version).
Furthermore, unlike Ginet’s account, this view articulates what makes an action
neutral, or praiseworthy or blameworthy to some degree. But the most important
aspect of this view is its uncomplicated account of moral responsibility - moral
responsibility requires complete control, the kind of control we are said to have
over our will alone (when our will is free). Every other sort of control, no
matter how contingently reliable, is mitigated, or partial control - that is to say
there is something other than us that may interfere with our will producing the
desired outcomes. For one to be morally responsible for one’s bodily movements
regardless of whether they’re intentional, or the movements of one’s arrow,
or for one’s misinformation that leads to mistake, and the like is to hold one
morally responsible for something one has no control over, and this - despite the
consistency with our folk moral linguistic practices - is absurd. One can only be
morally responsible for what one controls. However, to the extent to which one
is derivatively morally responsible for other things, it makes sense, in layman’s
terms, to say that one is morally responsible for such things. Such talk, at best,
captures the scope of one’s moral responsibility, which extends beyond one’s will
to its consequences. Talk about scope is, I think, justified because of the role in
which agents who are not privy to other’s inherently private will must reconstruct,
from their consequences and behavior, their own estimation of another’s will.
But this endeavor concerning the conditions under which judging people morally
responsible is justified, not the conditions under which an agent is truly morally
responsible.

William Simkulet, University of Wisconsin-Marshfield, Wood Country, USA
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